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Abstract
This study demonstrates how ethical attributes of goods affect mar-
ket outcomes on the basis of market data and actual ethical campaigns.
Among the various types of such attributes, such as eco-label and fair
trade label, I focus on cause-related marketing (CRM), which economists
study less frequently than other ethical attributes. Researchers who ana-
lyzed this topic focused largely on experimental data, which has less noise
and enables researchers to obtain the pure effect of ethical attributes on
market outcomes. However, ethical attributes in practice sometimes en-
counter ignorance and even criticism by consumers who deem it as a mere
marketing strategy, rather than a truly ethical campaign. These issues
play weak role in experimental data estimates because brands and cam-
paigns are typically artificial, but the important question is how ethical
attributes work in the real marketplace. Therefore, I analyze this issue
by estimating the demand for CRM on the basis of scanner data of the
US bottled water market and actual campaigns. Surprisingly, the results
indicate that CRM decrease sales and suggest that negative consequences
of ethical campaigns may occur in the real marketplace.
1 Introduction
In economics, the government is known to provide inadequate functions through
market mechanism. For example, income redistribution, one of the primary
functions of the government, is justified as a government activity because the
private sector may not sufficiently redistribute incomes. Another example is
public goods production. It is well known that if the onus of producing public
goods is left to the private sector, their attainable level will fall short of the
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socially optimal level. However, many theoretical and empirical studies have
verified that non-governmental players also influence the production of these
public functions 1. In brief, although governments are primarily responsible
for producing those functions, altruistic behavior by non-governmental players
also complement or substitute government activities2. But why is this so im-
portant? I think the advantage of altruistic behaviors is their self-motivated
attribute. Governments often face an efficiencyequity tradeoff with peremptory
intervention. For example, the non-availability of a lump-sum tax policy makes
governments use a distortional tax to implement a redistribution policy; how-
ever, this causes a distortion in the labor supplyan unwanted side effect of the
policy. In contrast, donations to the poor, for example, are actions taken by
one’s own preference, and therefore create less distortion in the economy than
government policy. However, not all altruistic behaviors are self-motivated.
One such example is corporate philanthropy, which may not result from self-
motivation, but de facto compulsion. Currently, there have been increasing
claims that a company’s social contributions are an obligation to society, and it
is generally considered that, in fact, standard practices and regulations exert a
de facto compulsion on corporate behavior. However, because companies are or-
ganizations whose inherent purpose is profit generation, they have the economic
incentive to subtly avoid social contributions. One example is forcing a company
to pay higher rates in a developing country than the standard rates determined
by the market. In these circumstances, the company can mitigate the effects
of such obligations by building fewer plants, or raising the capital/labor ratio
without any legal violations. In either case, the outcome is a reduction in the
demand for labor in that country, and unwanted distortions arise as a result of
such regulations. Certainly, many necessary regulations exist for ethical reasons
and I believe that not all companies necessarily circumvent those regulations;
however, it should be noted that policy effects are not straightforward in terms
of corporate responses. This problem results from the inconsistency between
economic and social objectives. In this example, the two objectives can be
compatible if goods produced under fair working conditions are more effectively
evaluated in the market. Ethical goods are one such tool. Consumers’ positive
reaction to goods produced in an ethical manner mitigates part of the additional
costs required for responsible production, and the gains may even exceed the
costs.
1For example, there is extensive research on crowding out hypothesis, which states that the
effect of income redistribution policy may be weakened or even invalidated by the reduction
of private income transfer (e.g. Barro (1974); Becker (1974); Bernheim et al. (1985); Cox
(1987, 1990); Cox and Rank (1992); Altonji et al. (1997); McGarry (1999)). There is also the
extensive literature on charity, donation, and private public goods production. (e.g. Abrams
and Schmitz (1978); Warr (1982); Roberts (1984); Bergstrom et al. (1986); Bernheim (1986);
Andreoni (1988, 1989, 1990); Ihori (1992); Andreoni (1993, 1995); Glazer and Konrad (1996);
Ihori (1996); Houser and Kurzban (2002); Ribar and Wilhelm (2002); Auten et al. (2002);
Andreoni and Payne (2003); Andreoni and Petrie (2004); Hungerman (2005); Potters et al.
(2005); Andreoni (2006); Karlan and List (2007); Ihori and McGuire (2007); Shang and Croson
(2009)).
2For instance, income transfer in a community (e.g., household, village), volunteering,
donation, and philanthropy.
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This study examines how ethical characteristics of goods affect market out-
comes, using market data and actual campaigns. Among the many types of
ethical goods, this study focuses on cause-related marketing (CRM). In short,
CRM can be described as campaigns by companies that pledge to donate a
certain portion of sales to good causes. In general, CRM can be defined as cam-
paigns that connect the company’s economic outcomes and social contributions
and highlight this fact to society. For example, through the Statute of Liberty
Restoration Project undertaken by American Express in 1983, the company do-
nated $1 to the project for every new credit card registered and 1 cent every time
one of their cards was used. They finally donated $1.7 million to the project.
In addition, this campaign also significantly impacted economic outcomes, with
the issue of new cards up by 45 % on a year-on-year basis and usage by 28 %
year-on-year growth. From this example, we confirm that CRM directly links
the donation conditions to the company’s economic performance, and the fact
that this is made evident to consumers is a significant departure from tradi-
tional social contributions. This CRM characteristic implies that consumers
can motivate companies to make donations and provide positive feedback to
such companies via their actions in the market. Simultaneously, as the example
demonstrates, the campaign also has considerable economic success. Another
way in which CRM differs from traditional social contributions, which it of-
ten receives criticism, is that such campaigns risk being seen merely as social
marketing activities (as the name indicates). That is, CRM activities, when
viewed positively by consumers, can influence company sales and profits in the
same manner as other characteristics of goods. This fact draws the criticism
that companies act in anticipation of these benefits, and use such campaigns
only in the pursuit of profits. From the outset, this study does not aim at
revealing true corporate motives as such a task would be impossible. Instead,
this study focuses on the possibility that the effects of CRM may be changed
by consumer’s perception toward the campaigns3, and estimates the effect by
combining market data and actual campaigns .
The ethical aspect of goods has traditionally been the topic of research in
management studies, (e.g. Varadarajan and Menon (1988); Strahilevitz and My-
ers (1998); Webb and Mohr (1998); Barone et al. (2000); Polonsky and Speed
(2001); Basil and Herr (2003); Olsen et al. (2003); Pracejus and Olsen (2004);
Lafferty and Goldsmith (2005); Luo and Bhattacharya (2006); Barone et al.
(2007); Lafferty (2007); Hoek and Gendall (2008); Lee Thomas et al. (2011))
however, they have also been widely researched by economists over the past
few years. Although various types of ethical goods exist, they share the fun-
damental concept of using labels as an indicator of a company’s commitment
to society. I briefly introduce them, referring to previous studies. As shown in
Teisl et al. (2002), with the regulatory changes made in 1990, the dolphin-safe
label resulted in the acceleration of tuna sales. This study pertains to eco-
labels, and investigates how demand is influenced by the assurance that goods
have been produced using eco-friendly methods. Fair trade label research, in
3whether that perception accurately reflects the company’s true motives
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contrast, deals with labels that guarantee that such products are made after the
consideration for producers in developing countries, and analyzes the impact
that such labels have on demand and the willingness to pay (E.g.Loureiro and
Lotade (2005); Arnot et al. (2006); Basu and Hicks (2008); Hainmueller et al.
(2011); Hiscox and Litwin (2011)). Arnot et al. (2006) was a field experiment
conducted with the cooperation of a coffee vendor on a university campus, which
revealed that a fair trade product had less price-sensitivity, implying that its de-
mand did not decrease as much as that of non-fair trade products when its price
increased. Prasad et al. (2004) is another fair trade example for a product other
than coffee. The researchers stocked adjoining shelves selling identical pairs
of socks in an American department store. On one shelf, and on the pairs of
socks themselves, they pasted labels stating Good Working Condition (GWC),
while they placed no such labeling on the other shelf and pairs of socks. Results
demonstrated that the ratio of sales was equal when both sets were identically
priced, but the fair trade socks retained a 25% share when their price increased.
Prasad et al. (2004) asserts that this result signified conscientious consumption.
Hiscox and Litwin (2011) represents e-commerce research, in which researchers,
with the aid of a coffee importing and roasting company, studied the impact
of labels on the winning bid price on eBay, by selling one lot of coffee beans
with a fair trade label, and another without such labeling. They found that the
winning bid price of the fair trade product was 20% higher. Hainmueller et al.
(2011) is probably the closest to my research in terms of its awareness of the
issues, in which it conducted a field experiment with the help of 26 stores of
a major US grocery store chain and performed a logit demand analysis on the
data obtained. They found that fair trade goods had less price elasticity than
those bearing generic coffee labels.
Thus, although many studies have examined fair trade and eco-labels, few
have explored CRM. However, fair trade and eco-labels are different in nature
compared with CRM in terms of the following three factors. First, fair trade and
eco-labels are certified by external authorities, which is rare in CRM. Therefore,
compared with other labels, CRM outcomes are more readily influenced by the
trust placed in the specific company or industry. Of course, external approval
influences certain cases, as CRM implementation involves the considerable coop-
eration with external nonprofit organizations (NPOs). However, CRM is often
limited to a specific time period, and thus the company in the long term can
cut ties with one NPO and build a cooperative relationship with another for
a different cause. For consumers who are only interested in a specific cause
or NPO, this change can be a disadvantage in terms of commitment. Second,
fair trade and eco-labels are on the basis of the premise of close production
relationships, which does not necessarily apply to CRM. Therefore, CRM has a
broad scope of application. Moreover, the fact that CRM need not necessarily
be related to production implies that it has a range of options among benefi-
ciaries, which may include citizens of developed countries. The aforementioned
American Express project is a good example of this factor. However, as the
environment and problems in developing countries are long-term issues closely
associated with production, the fair trade label or the eco label, with their inher-
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ent links to production, may present a better impression on consumers. Finally,
the most important difference is that consumers can directly influence donations
by purchasing goods with CRM. Of course, other labels are also related to sup-
porting a cause by making a purchase, but the marginal effect of the purchase
cannot be easily determined compared with CRM. The transparency of such
effects in CRM might work to its advantage when compared with other labels.
Ultimately, although CRM and other labels seem similar, they actually differ
in various aspects and, as one naturally anticipates differences in their impact
on market outcomes, I believe it is worthwhile to empirically demonstrate the
economic consequences of CRM.
McManus and Bennet (2011) describes research on such a CRM-like cam-
paign. Via NPO aid, they randomly offered various conditions to the people
who visited the NPO’s on-line shop and analyzed the impact of the difference
in these conditions on their purchasing behavior. In principle, this experiment
promised a separate donation being made from an outside fund if the purchaser
fulfilled specific conditions. The conditions were broadly categorized as follows:
(1) the purchaser needed only to purchase a product worth $10 or more; (2) In
addition to the purchase, the purchasers themselves also needed to make a do-
nation of $10 or more. These two categories were further subdivided according
to the amount of donation funded by the outside source, and whether discounts
applied to the purchased product. The results revealed that on average 20%
more revenue was generated from those consumers who were offered the dona-
tion pledge than from those who were not. However, what is surprising is that
this increase in revenue was primarily derived from excessively large increases in
purchase amounts, not required to trigger outside donations. Moreover, when
consumers did not make a donation themselves, despite it being required to
trigger the outside donation, they still increased their order amounts. How-
ever, consumers paid attention to the level of purchase amounts that would
trigger donations when the outside donation was comparatively high. They also
found that these responses were not the substitution from future. Their results
indicate that consumer response to socially linked products is complex.
To the best of my knowledge, previous studies usually use either a stated
preference measure or experimental data. Both have their advantages; the stated
preference measure is convenient and flexible, while experiments reduce noise in
the estimation and allow the use of data pertinent to one’s research question.
However, in my opinion, in the following three respects, the results calculated
by such methods may overestimate the real-world effect.
First, merely asking people for an assessment of CRM goods, or presenting
CRM goods and non-CRM goods to determine which one they would buy, may
not sufficiently motivate the respondent to express their true preferences. For
example, if the respondent wishes to be seen favorably, this method may moti-
vate them to over-emphasize the positive impact of CRM. If the experiment is
well planned, this factor may not be very problematic, but it is also possible to
address the issue using market data.
Second, studies that use the stated preference measure clearly state whether
a product implements CRM; this is often the case for studies that use the
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experimental method. However, these circumstances do not necessarily apply
when consumers purchase goods in the actual market. That is, the problem is
whether consumers are actually aware of such information when they make their
decisions. Although one can obtain CRM-related information in shops through
packaging and other labeling, if customers do not consider such information as
important, they would not pay much attention to it and may choose products
without being aware of all the facts. In fact Langen et al. (2010) uses an
information display matrix (IDM) to study the type of information considered
as important in decision making. They found that consumers do not consider
ethical attributes as important compared to price, taste, and brand. This issue
also exerts an overestimation on results, as it is reasonable to assume that if
consumers are unaware of a fact, they cannot affect demand. However, certain
studies have conducted experiments in simulated market situations, and so this
issue is not necessarily impossible to resolve in an experiment.
Finally, the most important difference is that ethical attributes are not nec-
essarily perceived in a positive light. In fact, companies in the American bottled
water market that this study analyses have come under increasing criticism from
the perspective of environmental protection; even their environmental initiatives
have often been criticized as greenwashing. CRM activities are also currently
facing criticism4; typical rumors include that most of the revenue does not go
toward donations, and therefore it is better to make donations personally and
drink tap water, which is more eco friendly. If consumers perceive a certain in-
dustry as systematically placing a burden on society, they will tend to perceive
donations as a ruse, and this opinion may cause a drop in sales. By experimen-
tal methods, the person conducting the experiment usually creates hypothetical
goods and campaigns, and performs analyses on the basis of short-term results.
This approach serves well to identify net influences in a virtually neutral state;
however, were such activities to take place over a long term in the real mar-
ketplace, such criticisms (whether justified or not) would be unavoidable. To
understand whether it is possible to use CRM activities to pursue the joint
goals of company profits and social contributions, we must conduct empirical
research that includes these negative influences, rather than merely including
the net effects, and I believe that this can currently be achieved only by using
market data.
To the best of my knowledge, no studies have combined actual purchase
data with real-world CRM campaigns. Accordingly, this study evaluates how
CRM affects the market share using only real-world market data. Because
most previous research has found a positive impact of ethical attributes, I think
measuring the effect in the real marketplace is important as a test of the results,
given the aforementioned possibility that the results may not hold in the real
marketplace. To test that, I use data on the bottled water market throughout
the United States from 2006 to 2010, obtained from IRI. I use the nested logit
model to infer demand and measure the impact of CRM. Surprisingly, the results
reveal that CRM exerts a negative impact on demand. Although I think that
4This trend is not specific to the industry.
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the result needs further verification by other researchers, it suggests that CRM’s
actual impact in the real marketplace is more limited than previously believed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation method to
measure the effect of CRM base on market data. Section 3 describes the data
and includes details of actual CRM campaigns. Section 4 reports the results
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation method
There are certain products which implement CRM while others do not. In
addition, even products that have implemented CRM for a time have periods
without CRM. My analysis attempts to estimate the impact of CRM on de-
mand by using this data structure. A major advantage of experiments is that
researchers can eliminate differences in product quality and price by simply
changing labels while keeping other attributes unchanged. In contrast, a com-
mon problem in studies that use observational data is that researchers actually
compare samples that are essentially different in nature. In general, one can ad-
dress this issue by setting primary explanatory factors as independent variables.
However, such literature states that it may have the problem of unobservable
factors. Therefore, I choose the bottled water market as the subject of my re-
search. Because the quality of water can be chemically examined, it is valid to
assume few unobservable factors. Nonetheless, certain factors remain difficult
to quantify as variables. I assumed these factors to be constant during the pe-
riod, and eliminated the risk by taking the difference to avoid generating bias
on other estimated values. Furthermore, by inserting time and seasonal dum-
mies, I eliminated other time-related effects. However, despite these processes,
the data quality remained relatively poor compared with experimental data.
This limitation is applicable generally when using observational data and is the
reason that the results must be interpreted with some reservations.
I adopted the structural estimation approach developed in industrial organi-
zation literature (Berry (1994); Berry et al. (1995); Nevo (2000, 2001)). By this
method, even with aggregated data at only the market level, we analyze product
choices by considering demand and price endogeneity. Moreover, by specifying
the indirect utility function, we directly obtain the estimation formula, there-
fore facilitating the examination of deep parameters. In addition, researchers
can select model specification from the simplest logit model to the most gener-
alized full random coefficient model. However, it is widely acknowledged that
when using the logit model, market share and price elasticity of demand are
not directly dependent on product properties but are determined by mean util-
ity level calculated from the product characteristics (Berry (1994); Berry et al.
(1995)). Therefore, I adopted the nested logit model to obtain reasonable results
without computational problems that might arise when using the full random
coefficient model. Regarding nest selection which is required to use the nested
logit model, this study divides data into one group that has undergone carbon-
ation and another that has not . This division follows Friberg and Ganslandt
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(2003), which analyzes the impact on welfare of a two-way trade using similar
data from Sweden. Following Berry(1994) and Town and Liu (2003), I specified
the indirect utility function as follows.
Uijmt = αpjmt + βxjmt + γDjmt + ξjm + εjmt + ζig + (1− σ)υijmt (1)
(2)
for i = 1, ..., N ; j = 0, ..., J ; g = 1, ..., G;m = 1, ...M ; t = 1, ..., T (3)
Here, the indicators are as follows: i = individual; j = brand; g = nest
that includes brand j; m = market; and t = time. The notation is a standard
one: pjmt = price of brand j; xjmt = product properties of brand j; and Djmt
= variable related to CRM. I divide unobserved heterogeneity in brand j into
ξjm, the portion that does not change over time, and εjmt, the portion that
does change over time. To simplify the notation, I define ωjmt ≡ [xjmt, Djmt].
Moreover, I define µjmt ≡ ξjm + εjmt. ζig represents common preferences for
goods belonging to nest g; υijmt is the deviation from the mean.
Djmt indicates whether CRM is implemented, and the coefficient represents
CRM evaluation by consumers. If consumers perceive CRM favorably, they can
indirectly increase donations by purchasing CRM goods because doing so can
increase their utility. However, if consumers dislike CRM activities, this nega-
tive reaction might instead cause a disincentive to purchase because they can
express their opinion by boycotting the products. Alternatively, if consumers
are indifferent to CRM, or when they understand it but do not translate it
into actions, then CRM is considered unlikely to affect their choices. In reality,
consumers vary greatly, and it is likely that a market outcome is decided by
the prevalent type of persons, which reflects the perception of CRM in society.
Assuming that υijmt follows the type-one extreme distribution, I obtain the
following estimation formula (Berry (1994)).
ln(sjmt)− ln(s0mt) = αpjmt + βxjmt + γDjmt + σln(sj/gmt) + ξjm + εjmt (4)
Note that sjmt is the market share of brand j in market m at time t, and
s0mt is that of external goods. This equation can be estimated using ordinary
least squares(OLS) if µjmt can be treated as an error term. However, the term
includes ξjm, which represents the unobservable quality of brand j in market m.
Since sj/gmt is the share of j in nest g, it probably correlates with the unob-
servable quality of the product. Moreover, higher quality implies higher prices;
therefore, the correlation among pjmt, ln(sj/gmt) and ξjm is the most debat-
able issue. Conversely, eliminating this term greatly reduces the probability of
endogeneity problems because εjmt is merely a demand shock. By solving the
problem by taking delta in relation to t, I arrive at the following formula.
∆ln(sjmt)−∆ln(s0mt) = α∆pjmt+β∆xjmt+γ∆Djmt+σ∆ln(sj/gmt)+∆εjmt
(5)
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If I were to disregard the endogeneity among ∆pjmt, ∆ln(sj/gmt) and ∆εjmt,
I could simply estimate this formula using OLS. In reality, endogeneity may
remain; therefore, it is necessary to use IV that correlates with ∆pjmt and
∆ln(sj/gmt), but not with ∆εjmt. Unfortunately, IV that fulfills all these criteria
cannot always be found, and in this case, the IV for ∆ln(sj/gmt) is particularly
difficult to obtain. This variable is probably endogenous, and it is extremely
difficult to separately obtain a relevant IV.
Therefore, I adopted system generalized method of moments (GMM) esti-
mation and attempted to utilize the historical values of the endogenous vari-
ables as IVs (Arellano and Bond (1991); Ahn and Schmidt (1995); Arellano and
Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998)). By this estimation method, both the
level and difference equations are used as GMM moment conditions. Giacomo
(2008) represents the earlier research that applied this method in the context of
structural estimation of demand. The difference equation yields the following
moment conditions.
E(∆ωjmt∆εjm,t) = 0 (6)
E(pjm,t−s∆εjm,t) = 0 (7)
E(ln(sj/gm,t−s)∆εjm,t) = 0 for m = 1, ...,M ; t = 3, ..., T s ≥ 2 (8)
This formula is based on the idea that ∆pjmt and ∆ln(sj/gmt) are treated
as endogenous variables and can be instrumented at their lags in levels, with
the most important assumption for identification being that there is no serial
correlation in εjm,t. To explain the necessity of this assumption, let AR(2) be
detected by the Arellano-Bond test. Then, the possible correlation between
pjm,t−2 and εjm,t−2 will propagate into E(pjm,t−2∆εjm,t) = 0 through the
construction of ∆εjm,t because εjm,t−1 in ∆εjm,t clearly correlates with εjm,t−2
by autocorrelation5.
In addition, moment conditions can be obtained from the level equation.
E(∆ωjm,t−1µjmt) = 0 (9)
E(∆pjm,t−1µjmt) = 0 (10)
E(∆ln(sj/gm,t−1)µjmt) = 0 for m = 1, ...,M ; t = 3, ..., T (11)
Combining these moment conditions to estimate parameters is the concept
of system GMM. In practice, too many moment conditions present a problem,
so usually estimations use only one lag at a time. I used the program provided
by Roodman (2006) in my actual estimations.
3 Data
Since I want to evaluate CRM ’s effect on sales in the real marketplace, I pur-
chased scanner data from IRI. I analyzed the bottled water market in the US
5Note that AR(2) detected by the Arellano-Bond test implies AR(1) in levels.
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because of their relative homogeneity and the fact that many products imple-
ment CRM. The dataset includes prices and sales volumes for each product for
eight regions in the US and for each quarter between 2006 and 2010. I recalcu-
lated and aggregated volumes of each brand into one standardized amount500
ml (16.9 oz)the most common size in the market. For data tractability, I re-
stricted my sample to balanced panel data. This restriction narrowed the data
to 40 products. I also eliminated products that held a negligible market share
and vitamin-added products, which are substantially differentiated by types of
vitamin and quantity added. This further narrowed the number of products to
16. For each product in the dataset, I calculated market shares, taking into ac-
count the existence of outside goods. The natural candidate for outside goods is
tap water, following Friberg and Ganslandt (2003). Further, I divided the sales
volume of each product by potential demand in each market, following Nevo
(2001). Potential demand is defined as the product of population in each mar-
ket and the number of days by 1/2, where 1/2 represents the assumption that
the volume consumed per person per day is 250 ml, which corresponds to the
actual value of 220 ml/day. I also gathered various product characteristics, such
as carbonated or non-carbonated water, minerals, pH, sodium, hardness, and
total dissolved solids (TDS) of each product because these natural attributes
determine product taste, and omitting them may cause an estimation bias. I
also defined three artificial variablesForeign, Flavor, and Publicto obtain reliable
estimation results. Foreign is a dummy variable that takes one if the product
is produced in a foreign country, and zero otherwise. Flavor is a dummy vari-
able that takes one if the product is artificially flavored, and zero otherwise.
Public is also a dummy variable that takes one if the product source is a tap,
and zero otherwise. I included the Public variable because bottled water from
a public source was especially criticized in this period from the perspective of
environmental protection. I also collected information on carbonation, which is
controlled through the construction of nests. Finally, I investigated whether each
product in the data set implemented CRM. In this study, I regarded products
as performing CRM if they satisfy the following two conditions: (1) economic
outcomes are directly related to the amount of donation, and (2) products are
sold in retailer outlets where the data is collected. For example, Ethos water,
which is probably one of most famous products with CRM in this market, was
excluded from the sample as it did not meet the second condition, because it
sold primarily at Starbucks coffee shops. Finally, three brands were selected on
the basis of the criteria as performing CRM during this period. First, Fiji water
announced in December 2009 that it was joining the 1% for the Planet alliance
and promised to donate 1% of their sales, considered to be a substantial amount,
to environmental projects. Accordingly, the CRM dummy for the brand takes
one after the first quarter of 2010. Second, Nestle PureLife partnered with the
Breast Cancer Research Foundation (BCRF) at the start of 2009, promising to
donate $0.10 to support the fight against breast cancer for each sale of 0.5l multi-
pack of Nestle Pure Life Purified Water marked with a pink ribbon. Because
the campaigns were done in October, its CRM dummy takes one in the fourth
quarters of 2009 and 2010. It has raised over $1.6 million toward BCRF and
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has supported breast cancer research significantly since it began. Third, Volvic
implemented two campaigns during this period. For each liter of the product
purchased between April 1 and August 31 in 2008 and 2009, Volvic promised
to donate $0.05 to the US fund for UNICEF to provide clean drinking water to
people in Benishangul Gumuz-one of Ethiopia’s water-scarce regions. According
to their statement, this project supplied clean drinking water to 25,000 people
in Ethiopia. In the campaign between August 1 and October 31, 2010, they
announced a new partnership with the Rainforest Foundation US and promised
to donate $0.05 to the foundation for the sale of every liter of the product. In
2010, the campaign raised $53,000 for the Rainforest Foundation’s rainforest
protection project. I defined the CRM dummy as taking one during (a) the sec-
ond and third quarters of 2008 and 2009 and (b) the third and fourth quarters of
2010. Ideally, I should have defined these dummies on monthly basis, but unfor-
tunately, monthly data was unavailable because of limited budget constraints.
Therefore, my best alternative was to define the CRM on a quarterly basis. I
review this point when I check robustness of the results. Again, note that I
DO NOT suggest that these campaigns are spurious. In fact, I personally view
them very favorably because they have contributed substantially to society, as
described above. In addition, I like the idea of ethical labels because it is a
possible solution for the incentive incompatibility problem. Please understand
that all I want to do is to measure how people react to them in acutual market.
These data come primarily from bottled water quality reports on official
websites. However, for some products, the brand characteristics are not publicly
available. Fortunately, sufficient information was obtained from Saleh et al.
(2008), which examined the chemical properties of bottled water brands sold in
the US.
4 Results
Table 1 reports the overall results. For consistency, no significance is required for
MA(2) tests and Sargan statistics. As the lower half of the table reveals, the re-
sult passed both tests. That is, there are no serial correlations and specification
errors, thus confirming the result’s reliability6.
As expected, the price coefficient α was negative and significant. The co-
efficient of Sjg is σ, which represents the correlation of preference within the
group; this value should lie between 0 ≤ σ < 1 (Berry (1994)). My results
yielded the value of 0.917, which lies in the appropriate range and indicates a
strong correlation within the group. Among many other significant variables,
the impact of sodium and hardness were clearly negative. I think this result
is plausible because many people are aware of the effects of sodium on health,
which was listed as an ingredient on the label. Furthermore, the fact that soft
water is preferred to hard water is also relevant because investigations revealed
that a significant portion of popular brands sell soft water. TDS results were
6In addition, there was virtually no change in results when I checked the robustness by
increasing the value of s.
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Table 1: Result
(1)
VARIABLES Share
Price -0.566***
(0.143)
Sjg 0.917***
(0.0783)
pH 0.602**
(0.248)
Sodium -0.00860***
(0.00234)
Hardness -0.0205***
(0.00375)
TDS 0.00895***
(0.00182)
Flavor 1.138
(0.767)
Foreign 0.523
(0.610)
Public 0.0297
(0.499)
CRM -0.368***
(0.104)
M1 -1.29
M2 -1.26
Sargan 52.05
(0.394)
Observations 2,560
Number of BRID 128
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Result2
(1)
VARIABLES Share
Price -0.556***
(0.147)
Sjg 0.920***
(0.0769)
pH 0.629**
(0.255)
Sodium -0.00870***
(0.00229)
Hardness -0.0205***
(0.00387)
TDS 0.00898***
(0.00187)
Flavor 1.185
(0.778)
Foreign 0.529
(0.641)
Public 0.0117
(0.487)
CRM -0.408**
(0.166)
M1 -1.32
M2 -1.35
Sargan 54.29
(0.314)
Observations 2,560
Number of BRID 128
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Result3
(1) (2)
VARIABLES s= 2 s = 3
Price -0.556*** -0.535***
(0.131) (0.140)
Sjg 0.885*** 0.925***
(0.0493) (0.0585)
pH 0.582*** 0.681***
(0.225) (0.217)
Sodium -0.00853*** -0.00880***
(0.00198) (0.00225)
Hardness -0.0202*** -0.0209***
(0.00298) (0.00370)
TDS 0.00880*** 0.00914***
(0.00148) (0.00181)
Flavor 0.986 1.439**
(0.634) (0.578)
Foreign 0.514 0.681
(0.514) (0.499)
Public 0.110 0.0852
(0.458) (0.430)
CRM -0.420** -0.469**
(0.166) (0.206)
M1 -3.48
M2 -6.26 0.40
M3 -0.67
Sargan 2358.13 10.15
(0.000) 1.000
Observations 2,560 2560
Number of BRID 128 128
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
14
rather different from what was anticipated. As this variable possesses the same
ingredients as hard water, I expected that their coefficient signs would be the
same, or that one or the other would prove not significant. The result revealed,
however, that TDS is positive and significantthe opposite of hardness. Since
TDS is an important factor in giving water its unique taste, I interpreted this
result to conclude that a product whose water is different from other products
can attain its market share on this factor alone. On analyzing explanatory
variables other than chemical properties, flavor has a positive but insignificant
effect. Moreover, it is interesting to see how water sources affect product de-
mand because, from the perspective of environmental issues or free-riding, many
citizen groups criticize companies that use public water systems as their water
source. The result demonstrated that products that source their water from the
public water system receive a marginally negative evaluation from consumers,
but the coefficient is insignificant. This outcome may reflect the fact that the
taste differs depending on the source, or it may express consumer antipathy
toward public water source usage.
The most surprising aspect of the estimation results is the negative and
significant coefficient of CRM. Of course, I had anticipated that this might oc-
cur because my research question is the risk of the overestimation created by
using artificial data. However, the result surprised me because I was of the
opinion that a positive but smaller(or even insignificant) estimate was more
likely, considering that most previous research had detected a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient. A straightforward interpretation of this result is that CRM
has a negative impact on sales, and it suggests that many consumers oppose
such campaigns. Recently, the bottled water industry has come under severe
criticism, largely regarding environmental protection, and therefore is highly
probable that its critics perceive CRM as a ruse to make profit, rather than
an authentic charitable activity. In fact, many negative opinions were gathered
toward CRM during data collection. In addition, such opponents need not con-
stitute the majority; the result also reflects those who can be considered neutral,
wherein they were unaware about the campaign, or, if they did know, it did not
influence their brand selection. Even so, I found the results rather surprising.
Hereafter, I give careful consideration to the fact that this study was based
on observational data. First, I eliminated a number of variables and re-estimated
the equation to check the robustness of the estimates, but the results remained
fundamentally unchanged. Second, I tested my definition of the CRM dummy.
As previously noted, because my data was provided only at the quarterly level,
the CRM dummy was defined inaccurately. To eliminate the possible resultant
bias, I attempted at another specification that defined the CRM dummy dif-
ferently, taking one only if a product has two or three months of CRM in a
quarter 7. The result in Table 2 demonstrates that the estimates remained fun-
damentally unchanged. I also checked other settings, but found no significant
difference. Therefore, I confirm that the construction of the variable does not
7In my opinion, this majority setting is another natural construction of the CRM dummy
for my data.
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strongly influence my estimates. Finally, I checked for possible CRM endogene-
ity. Companies can use CRM as a countermeasure against negative demand
shock, and so the result might reflect endogeneity bias from this behavior8. Ide-
ally, this problem should be resolved using an exogenous instrumental variable
correlated with CRM but not correlated with its demand. However, because
such an instrumental variable is unobtainable, I treated the CRM dummy in
the same way as p and sj/g, and re-estimated the equation. Table 3 reports
the result. Unfortunately, as can be seen from column (1) of the table, when
s = 2, the M2 test result is significant. In addition, the maintained hypoth-
esis was rejected. However, this issue could be resolved by taking longer lags
and discarding shorter lags. Fortunately, with s = 3 (column (2)) there was no
serial correlation, and the hypothesis was not rejected, while the results were
unchanged.
Despite sufficient statistical controls, the results are very robust. I can con-
fidently state from the results that the negative coefficient does not come from
statistical problems and negative feedback toward CRM is a more plausible
explanation for the negative coefficient. However, if experiments are more re-
alistically designed, one might identify the impacts of ethical attributes in the
real world more precisely than done in this study. We should wait for the
implementation of such studies before reaching any conclusion .
5 Conclusion
Measuring the effect of ethical attributes on market outcomes is important to
determine whether both economic and altruistic purposes can be pursued simul-
taneously. Although many researchers have addressed this topic, they used data
in virtual situations, and not in the real marketplace. In this study, I provided
evidence from the real marketplace based on scanner data and actual campaigns
conducted in the US bottled water market. Surprisingly, the results revealed
a negative effect of CRM on sales, opposed to prior research using survey or
experimental data. This finding can be explained by the negative responses of
skeptical consumers. Because a number of people object to ethical labels on
the grounds that such labeling is motivated by profit and not by social welfare,
I believe that the results are realistic. In addition, the bottled water indus-
try came under severe criticism by environmentalists during the study period.
These background conditions may have caused negative attitudes toward CRM,
which is often considered a ruse for increasing corporate profit. Of course, using
market data increases the possibility of estimation bias. With more sophisti-
cated experiments, this issue may be treated more effectively, producing results
that differ from those indicated in this study. Although my results seem robust,
we should await the research findings of other studies.
It is most important to determine whether the negative result is market
specific. It is possible that the (positive) effect declines or enters the negative
8In reality, the decision to implement a CRM campaign is usually made long before its
implementation. Therefore, I believe that this problem is unlikely, and I confirm that below.
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range as time passes if consumers become indifferent to, or skeptical about,
ethical campaigns. For example, consumers may begin to think that CRM is a
profit-oriented campaign because of its long-term duration. Because my data
differs from that of other researchers in terms of the data span, the difference in
findings may result from such a declining effect which influences my sample more
heavily than those of others. If the study’s duration explains the difference, it
implies that short-term CRM campaign success does not guarantee long-term
success. However, if such an effect does not occur, industry specific factors
might change the effectiveness. Thus, it is important that future studies clarify
the effect in other industries and in different campaign time-spans to determine
whether we can pursue two-seemingly unrelated purposes simultaneously.
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